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PLANNING AND DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE

April, 1965

Larry G. Massanari

In the beginning of 1962, France launched its Fourth Plan to

cover the period 1962-1965, and entered its sixteenth year of economic
planning,

Parodoxically, France which has so frequently seemed determined

to demonstrate to the world an absolute incapacity for self-government

has at the same time carried out a complicated experiment in economic
planning, the results of which have frequently been brilliant; this is
not to suggest that through planning the French have found answers to

all of the many difficulties which still face them.

It was immediately

after World War II that France embarked upon their experiment in planning.
The task ahead was considerable, and circumstances convinced the Provisional
Government that long-term planning was necessary.

The bitter experience

of stagnation in the thirties, which had found the economy falling

farther and farther behind those of other industrialized nations, and
the crushing defeat of the war persuaded them that their economy was

hopelessly anarchistic and ill-adapted to the challenge of providing
its people with a modern standard of living.

Postwar economic survival

and progress depended upon a systematic overhaul of the economic structure,
a task hardly possible without some form of planning.

Secondly, in 19^S, France was still suffering from material
destruction, financial disorganization, and a legacy of war; the urgency
on one hand, and the limited means which the country possessed on the

other made it requisite that actions be coordinated and priorities
determined.

Finally, a number of key industries had been or were about

to be nationalized (electric power, gas production, coal etc.), and with

the public sector in a dominant position in the economy some degree of
overall planning was inescapable.

Thus, in light of these circumstances

the Provisional Government under DeGaulle entrusted to Jean Monnet the
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task of preparing an overall plan that defined the priority goals to be

reached and the means to be employed in order to attain them, and in so
doing accepted the alternative with which the Commissariat for the Plan

prefaced its own action: "Modernization or decadence.**

The relatively

modest beginnings of short-term planning which survived the critical
period of reconstruction have evolved into a comprehensive scheme of
resourse allocation, and planning has become a permanent institution,

The encouraging results achieved in the postwar period have led France
to consider planning as a necessity independent of periods of

stagnation and expansion.

The French Plan, then, was not a conscious

application of an ideology, as in the case of the totalitarian countries,
but rather it was born out of necessity — the application of an
experimental method to economic growth.

As recently as two decades ago the term "economic planning** was

usually understood to refer to centralized control of the economy as
practiced in the Soviet Union.

But in recent years economists have

used the term to imply that the government has organized its decision
making process so as to take account of all the economic effects of

each of its acts, the total program of actions being a coherent one

designed to achieve as rapid economic growth as is consistent with other
national goals.

The government plans in order to frame and execute a

program which will balance all of the goals of the economy against each

other and to achieve the degree of each that will yield the greatest
satisfaction to the people.

Economic planning is not intended neces

sarily to increase the degree of government control over the economy, but
is intended to make the government aware of the effects of governmental

actions in the economy in order to avoid inadvertent impacts.

Almost any

governmental activity affects the private and public sectors of the

system whether or not this effect is intended? an example being a change
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in government expenditures which without any other government action
may greatly affect private economic activity.

Every true plan is simply

an expression of collective determination to steer the economic system

in the direction of what is seen as progress; as distinct from the plans
of individual firms, a national plan constitutes the action of a
community which is subordinating the decisions of natural persons and

corporations to the achievement of coordinated aims within a fixed period.
The fact that planning originated in the Soviet Union has given

the public a false notion of its essential nature which is characterized
neither by authoritarianism nor by collective ownership of the means of

production.

The "Plan** exemplified by the French system —

"flexible"

or "indicative"—is only one type of planning, and in adopting this
method, the French have tackled the problem of how to reconcile freedom
of choice for the consumer and the business man with centralized

direction.

Flexible planning deals with a restricted number of targets

usually established per branch rather than per firm and allows considerable

freedom of action to the entrepreneurs.

Fixed objectives are layed down

for the basic sectors, most of which are nationalized, but the Plan only
suggests targets for the majority of the manufacturing industries.

In an "imperative" system of planning the future is rigorously determined;
in a flexible plan it is merely indicated in its broad lines, the
necessary adjustments to unforeseen developments being regarded as a
matter for day-to-day action and operations of the automatic mechanisms.
In the preparation of the plan the authorities cannot regard

themselves as having sole responsibility, owing to the existence of
a large sector of private production.

The discussion of economic

questions among the different agents in various committees facilitates
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the drafting of a plan which private business interests are more ready
to adopt, because they have helped to formulate it.

Procedure consists

o£ assembling and combining schemes put foreward by individual firms and

trends manifested by consumers, rather than setting up targets a priori.
Generally speaking, planning is carried out by offering financial

incentives with a minimum of constraints and prohibitions.

In at least

part of the public sector the financial authority excercised over firms

by the Finance Ministry is probably as imperious as the means adopted
in the Soviet Plan, but in the rest of the economic field, the means of

fulfillment are used indirectly and may be properly described as

incentives.

Too, much is achieved by persuasion, by pointing out the

advantage to be gained through participation in the system of development
outlined in the Plan;

that advantage.

Many French business leaders are now convinced of

Wage-earner's organizations would adopt the same

attitude if the system of employment were reforemd so that they no

longer needed to regard opposition as the sole method of advancement
and could have a greater voice in the decisions that affect their future.
The features of flexible planning are well suited to the structure

of a democratic country like France in which there must be flexibility

due to the existence of private firms, where decisions are made in
relative independence; the fact that the powers of the state are limited;

and the freedom of choice enjoyed by the consumers, or at least by those
categories of consumers whose incomes are in excess of their basic

requirements.

Yet, a section of economic opinion remains hostile to the

idea of planning, holding the conviction that no collective economic

decision can leave enough scope for individual freedom of choice.

The

Soviet example is adduced to show that the whole concept of planning is
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radically opposed to that of freedom and that it requires an enormous,

all-powerful central administration dominating every sphere of economic
life.

The French experiment is, of course, to some extent reassuring;

it is taking place in a political atmosphere which it cannot so far
be said to have rendered anti-democratic.

However, from a political

angle (without falling into the errors of the Marxists and neo-liberals

who believe that any plan must necessarily be imperative) one must admit
that certain problems of "planning and democracy" have not yet been

solved, and that the Plan in its present form does give rise to a number
of queries.

No way has yet been found for reconciling the coordination

of decisions regarding prices, production, and income with some measure

of decentralization; for imposing a necessary degree of constraint, while
respecting the freedom of firms and individuals; or for ensuring the
continuity of economic management, while encouraging the participation
of all of the interested groups.

Nor has the arrangement in France

disposed of the dangers that individuals and firms may find their liberty
sacrificed to collective constraint, that large firms may invoke that
very liberty as a means of bringing state plans under their own influence,
and that the technocrats may slowly wrest the economic control of the
state out of the hands of the political authority and away from the

other groups in the community.

Thus, while little objection can be

made to its organization, a good deal of criticism can be expressed
regarding its range, methods by which it is put into effect, and the
procedure for its political control.

I wish to show, then, that while a democratic system is not
incompatible with economic planning, serious problems are raised by
the coexistence of planning and democracy; I shall deal with both the

6

democratic nature of the French Plan and some of the relevant problems
which have arisen since its inception.

If economic planning is to be

considered democratic, at least two conditions must be fulfilled.

The

first relates to the substance of the |>lan, the direction of production,
which must satisfy in priority the needs of the community, pursue the
aims of the general interest, and ensure that they will be fulfilled;

in short, the Plan must be democratic in content.
with the;procedure for decision making and action.

The second deals
The Plan must be

the expression of the general will, and there must be active participation

of the citizens by their representatives in the drafting, executing, and
control of the plan.

This means not only that there must be broad

agreement between the citizens as to the ends of each plan, but a general
consensus as to the finality of economic activity.

Without this agreement

and participation it is difficult to see how the needed discipline for

planning could be imposed, for planning must not make individual choice
impossible for persons or groups.

It must be compatible with the

democratic system.

In the immediate post-war period the planners paid more attention

to economic requirements than to social needs.

This is reasonable

enough in view of the urgent problems of reconstruction and development

that had to be faced.

They also feared that recovery might be impeded

by the adoption of ill-considered social policies, and they believed
that planning would in any case be of "social" benefit by increasing

production to the maximum, adjusting output to the needs of the consumers,
and preventing slumps and unemployment.

However, by the time of the

Second Plan, the planners realized that the human element did not
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necessarily develop harmoniously in any and every form of economic

expansion; they, therefore, gave priority to certain branches of the
economy because they were important to the community.

housing, health services, and schools.

Among these were

One of the principle features of

the Fourth Plan has been the emphasis placed upon providing for social

equipment, improving the living standard of the "less-favored" groups,
and developing a more equitable balance between the different geo
graphical regions.

The importance accorded to social development in

the present plan is reflected in the rapid advance in investments for
the improvement of the physical and social environment in which the
individual lives.

Special priority has been given to housing improve

ment, urban and rural development, public education, cultural facilities,
and public health.

To set up targets for income distribution would carry the planners
far beyond the present "social plan" which deals with collective and

individual investments (hospitals, roads, etc.) and provides for various
welfare services.

While it does make recommendations concerning the

incomes of the small wage-earners, farmers, and old people, no
comprehensive picture showing the desirable distribution of income

among the different soical and occupational categories has so far
been presented; nor is there a "national wages policy."

Although a

guided distribution of incomes may be desirable in the interest of

soical justice, it would be impossible without a fundamental change in
both the institutions involved and in the mentality of the parties
concerned.

A policy of this nature gives rise to a number of political and
economic questions.

approached?

From what angle is income distribution to be

Are the wage-earners to be promised the equivalent of the
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increase in production, or more?

The respective groups concerned could

find arguments to prove the unfairness of either policy, for both of
them are too rigid.

Perhaps the most important question is whether a

democratic government has the means of compelling all of the parties
to comply with suchaa plan.
Moreover, the principal groups in the French community are hostile

in practice, if not in theory, to a "Social Plan" which includes a wage
policy.

The employers are not in favor of a policy which anight restrict

their freedom of action; they are well aware that wages, left to them
selves will tend to lag behind the rate of expansion, and they take

advantage of the resultant margins of profit.

They are afraid, too,

that the planners might make mistakes which would be at the expense of
their firms.

Strange as it may seem, the trade unions are even less

eager to see the strict regulation of wages.

Some of them fear that

government intervention would not be impartial.

They urge the necessity

of defending the legitimate demands of the workers, including the right
to fix wages by agreement, against the danger of a "unilateral" and
restrictive system of wage increases.

French planning was institutionalized with the thought of democratic
participation in mind so that the Plan might be a concerted effort.

It

was felt that the active forces within the nation must be closely
associated with the preparation of the plan through the representatives

of the various social categories or local groups.

Although some degree

of success has been achieved in establishing a "democratic" organization,
many weaknesses still exist.

The Economic and Social Council which

includes representatives of the different socio-economic groups
constitutes a link between the Modernization Commissions and the
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Parliament in the elaboration of the Plan.

During the first three

Plans, the Council like Parliament was not consulted until the final

drafting of the Plan; this procedure, however, was changed for the

Fourth Plan.

Since the beginning of i960, the government has consulted

the Council's Investment and Planning Section which includes represen
tatives from the same areas as those in the Economic Social Council;

the Council is, thus, informed of the Plan's general goals before the
completion of the detailed studies of the Modernization Commissions.

The Council is later invited to express an opinion on the final texts
prior to their examination by Parliament.

Although the Council seems to be exceptionally well qualified
to represent the various economic and social interests involved, its
present composition should be amended to make it fully representative

of the interests which are not effectively organized, such as the low
income groups and the immigrants.

It should play a two-fold role:

(1) advise the government on economic and social problems, (2) and
advise Parliament whenever that body is brought into close association
with the planning process; on such occassions the specialized section
of the Council would collaborate with the Pariliamentary Committees.

This would, of course, entail more extensive preliminary consultation

of the Council, for at present only its Investment and Planning Section
is called upon, and its discussions are not make public.

The whole

Council should be associated with planning, and it should discuss not
merely the rates of expansion, but all of the basic choices of policy

to be made in such matters as family welfare, military expenditures and
so forth.

The Council should also have a hand in supervising the

fulfillment of the Plan.
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The High Planning Council which was created in 19^6, but reorganized
in 1961, considers the draft of the Plan prepared by the Commissariat for
submission to the government and gives its opinions upon it; it also

supervises the application of the Plan year by year, reporting on its
execution and proposing all appropriate measures to the government.

It

is headed by the Premier and includes representatives of management,

labor, the Regional Expansion Committees and the Economic and Social
Council.

Being a comparatively small body it might play a genuine

and active part in the actual planning, which it does not do under
the present structure.

The Plan, being flexible, depends for its

implementation of the participation and approval of the interests
involved.

Flexibility is demonstrated by a number of contacts between

the public authorities and private enterprise, but such contacts ought
to be extended to groups such as wage-earners, entrepreneurs and Civil

Service departments who are also concerned with the requirements of
economic growth and the distribution of its benefits.

However, the

necessary increase in group representation on the various councils

would entail, at the very least, a far-reaehing transformation of
present attitudes.

The Modernization Commissions, which constitute the really original
feature of the French system, make proposals for their respective
branches and submit them to the Commissariat whose task is to then

coordinate the projects.

Since the Commissions include representatives

of the administration, business leaders, experts, and wage-earners, they
are able to thresh out the different opinions on the development of
each individual branch with very useful results, particularly as their

organization is directly responsible to the Executive.

This close

11

collaboration between the government and the different branches of the
economy marks the inception of a revolutionary development; the active

participation of the different ministries, which too often tend to
work in watertight compartments, is also noteworthy.

attempt is made though

Moreover, an

not always successful, to avoid sterile

controversy by ensuring that the Commissions will be representative of

the "general will," rather than of groups of interest, and to obtain
the widest possible agreement about development prospects, rather than
to secure majority votes.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the

proportion in which the different groups are represented.

All this

takes the system a long way from the established attitudes of parliamentary
democracy and emphasizes the desire for collective, rather than
majority decisions.
The role of the Commissions is essentially an advisory one.

The

fact that they do not make decisions leaves the individual members free
to form and announce their opinions, more especially as no vote is
taken at the end of their deliberations.

However, to go no further that

consultation involves the danger that the central authorities may feel

at liberty to decide matters as it chooses.

While the duty of preventing

this must be left to the political institutions, not to technical bodies
such as the Modernization Commissions, the Commissions might be
strengthned by entrusting the most important among them with a continuous

role in the supervision of the execution and revision of the Plan.

Above

all, they should be given a greater part in the preparing of the Plan,
for up to now each Commission has simply taken up the forecasts included
in the government's instructions for its particular branch of the economy
and discussed their soundness.
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To enlarge the role of the Commissions does not mean extending the

scope of planning, for successive governments should hesitate to

intervene further in economic matters, particularly at the level of the
firms.

But the Qommissions, if they were less interested in claims on

points of detail, could devote their attention to the principal decisions
affecting development, such as the choice to be made between important
but incompatible projects put forward by different firms in a particular
branch, or between expansion in two different sectors.

An enlargement

of their role would mean that the statistical information presently
available to the experts and the union representatives would have to
be appreciably improved, and that the authorities must resolutely adopt
the practice of arbitration between the expansionist ambitions of
rival firms.

The present lack of information is largely responsible for the

sense of isolation still felt by the workers' representatives in the

Commissions.

The unions have insufficient sources of information and are,

thus, handicapped vis a vis the managers.

To alter the composition of

the Commissions in the manner advocated by some would not be a wise
solution for the purpose of altering this situation.

It has been

suggested that representation should be strictly tripartite (one-third

labor, one-third management, and one-third experts).

This would be a

revision to vote counting and would render these technical and advisory

bodies completely sterile.

It would mean abandonning the basic principle

that members of the Commissions are appointed on personal merits, not
as representatives of rival interests; and although wage-earners and

employers often select their own representatives, that principle does
make it possible to slip some really impartial members into the Commissions.
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Although a rigidly tripartite system seems inadvisable, it would

be a good idea to include more workers, for "democratic" consultation
in the Commissions is often not much better than it is in the other

planning agencies.

The workers who are sometimes outnumbered on the

Commissions by ten to one, are often too few to gain a hearing and to
appoint their representatives as chairman of some of the Commissions;
up to now the workers have been unable to appoint a chairman.

The

inclusion of additional labor representatives would strengthen the
trade unions' influence which is at present far too small.
In considering the question of group participation, one can not

underestimate the obstacles generated by the determination of the

individual organizations to avoid committing themselves, in order to
keep their fighting force intact.

Employers organizations, as well as

the three trade union federations, are reluctant to accept undertakings
which might be turned to their disadvantage by their rivals.

Group

committments would become even more unreliable, if the Plan were to
proceed from the study of the technical conditions of expansion to an

incomes policy, for that is the crucial point of the struggle.

It is

rash, at least at this point, to hope for any lasting agreement on
such subjects as income distribution to which both sides would be

loyal.

Thus, group representation is bound to result in unreliable,

short-lived definitions of "the general interest" which must be carefully
watched over and constantly amended.
There is an unquestionable need for planning to be shared by other

groups than those at the summit, and this raises the question of
participation at the local and regional levels.

The lack of a sense of

involvement among the actual firms is the cause of indifference and

misunderstanding which have tended to hold up the progress of the Plan.
The man on the street knows nothing about the plan, and this ignorance

is shared even by the staff of some public corporations.

A sense of

involvement is impossible without at least some contact between the

different levels of a firm, and here the joint-management committees, and
other organ* of liaison fall far short of their purpose.

Opposition

by the groups at the base is preventing collaboration at the summit, or
is at any rate hampering it.

Joint study of the aims of the Plan

undertaken at the base (at least in each branch if not in every firm)
would make a useful contribution to co-management, by providing a basis
for discussion.

It became evident in the early stages that planning must have a

regional structure in order to reduce the friction between decisions made

at the top and independent interests, and to establish that flow of
information between the base and the summit which is the essence of

a democratic system.

At the institutional level the part played by

the local bodies has gradually increased since June 30» 1955* when the

regional development programs were first established; these regional
programs were set up to supplement national planning by applying the

government's decisions within the compass of the local economies.
Although a complex organization has been instituted, this plethora

of organization should not deceive one, for the creation of institutions
with a localized activity does not lead automatically to decentralization;

though without it, there is little that local groups can do.
More often than not the Regional Development Associations are
simply a screen for the "big" organization in Paris.

Local authorities

have less and less control over the decisions of private finances.

The
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last attempts at regional financing are being crushed by the centralization

of the banking system, and by the destruction of the machinery for local
financing to which the Stock Exchange reforms dealt a new blow.

Administrative decentralization, too, is only a hope.

The Civil Service

is operating through the narrow channels of the ministerial departments

and is still highly centralized.

The regional directors have no power

to undertake studies or to coordinate the surveys carried out by
public and private bodies.

The consultation of the local groups is

slowly becoming an empty formality.

It is utterly irrational to ignore the preferences of the producers

and consumers, for the purpose of a "democratic" economy is to consider
and satisfy them.

Local bodies ought to be created which could give

expression to the preferences which elude economic calculations, but
can be ascertained through local representatives.

This would offer a

way of escape from the deadlock created by the excessive reliance upon

economic statistics.
responsibility.

Regional bodies should also be given more

Preparation of the regional plans might be entrusted

( at least in part) to representatives of the regions concerned, and
the central authorities would then cease to excercise supervision and
control over local decisions in matters of minor significance.

Most

important of all, local financing should be thoroughly overhauled and
the decentralized authority left to handle the funds earmarked for
various duties which would then be entrusted to them.

If those duties

were clearly defined, the present disorderly trend towards the
nationalization of all expenditures would be brought to a stop.

While the need for planning is now almost unquestioned in France,
there is considerable controversy as to how the different measures can
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best be enforced.

In its present frjam the implementation of the Plan

is certainly compatible with the democratic system, for it comprises a
set of general instructions with only limited powers of constraint.

It

comes before Parliament as a set of instructions, intentions, and
guiding principles; none of these have the force of law, they merely
announce and pave the way for a limited number of subsequent measures,
A chief criticism of the First Plan, before its institution, was
that it could not be carried to completion because of the state's

inability in a free society to exercise the amount of authority necessary

to make individuals sacifice their present desires for future benefits.
In complex societies, however, the instruments of economic contr6l at
the disposal of even a democratic government are numerous and powerful:
price and wage control, output rationing, resource allocation by
priorities, and exchange control are but a few.

That these measures

are clearly within the power of a democratic state is attested by the

wartime experience of the democracies and the postwar development in

Great Britain under the Labor Government.

The paradoxical fact about

planning in postwar France was that the Commissariat had at its disposal
few, if any, of these instruments of direct control to use for the
implementation of the Plan.

The direct controls which were instituted

in France with the outbreak of war in 1939, disintegrated with extreme
rapidity after liberation.

In fact, the issue of direct verses indirect

controls was settled prior to the drafting of the First Plan, the
occassion being the resignation in April, 19^5, of Mendes-France, who

favored the retention and strengthening of direct controls, as
Minister of the National Economy.
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The only authoritarian measures still maintained are the building
permit, the authorization to establish industries in the district of

Paris, and the permit to open an oil refinery.

Preemptory orders are

avoided so far as possible out of consideration for the freedom and

independence of private firms.

Nevertheless, the planners are by no

means powerless to put the needed pressures on individuals so that they
will act according to the Plan.

Great emphasis is placed upon psychological factors.

Implementation

of the Plan is based partly upon the belief in the virtue of human
contacts.

Experience has shown that thsoe associated with the

preparation of the Plan do their best to see that it is carried out; in
many casses it is in their own interests to observe the growth targets

prescribed for each segment, since the resultant equilibrium is favorable
to the markets and resources.

But because individual interests are not

always identical with the general advantage, some degree of constraint
remains indispensable.

This constraint is excercised by financial

methods in preference to compulsory measures.

Thus, the twin feature

of French planning is the small number of its means of enforcement, and
the importance of financial measures at its disposal.
The first area of enformcement is direct financing by the budget

and the treasury which takes three main forms; (1) Budgetary appropria

tions, (2) tax exemptions, (3) and direct loans from the F.D.E.S. (the
Economic and Social Development Fund).

A second major area is the

employment of financial incentives in the private sector.

The control

of credit, the control of bond issues on the Stock Exchange, and the
issuing of investment bonuses to firms which build in the depressed
areas are but a few of the ways in which the government can intervene
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to ensure the fulfillment of the programs laid down in the Plan.

Thus,

through financial measures implementation has remained democratic, and
free enterprise and competition have been maintained.

The First Plan consisted of empirical devices created by the

technocrats for breaking through certain bottlenecks in the capital goods

industries and in getting business on the move.

Since that time, the

choices of action have become much more complex, and there has become
an obvious need for more effective democratic control.

Political

control of planning has two aspects: the first, relates to the control

of the administrative machinery set up to implement the Plan; the second,
relates to the control of the Plan itself.

The French Civil Service does not seem to have any particular
penchant for "technocratic dictatorship".

But the colorless Parlia

ments and the unstable executives before DeGualle were seemingly

indifferent to economic matters, and this made it easy to shake off

the constraints of the past; many of the Civil Servants were not sorry

to see that the politicians who at one time opposed their plans are
now reduced to impotence.

It is possible that they could perpetuate a

situation where they can uninterruptedly, and in their opinion effeciently,

direct the life of the economy which they are apt to regard as a firm
run by technicians.

This situation has its perils, for it is carried

out without democratic support.

With a weak or non-existent legislature,

they are relieved of external pressures, and the rifts between the
government branches widens accordingly.

Private interests which

formerly made use of the members of Parliament now try to influence

the Civil Service.

In the absence of any "counter-veiling" power such
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influence goes unchecked.

A persistence of this state of things might

give rise to a quasi-oligarchy which would be wholly anti-democratic.

The decree of January 5> ^9^» did not specify the form which the
political control of the Plan would take.

The new institution, co

existing with the traditional parliamentary system, might have turned
in a completely different direction than the one which is now being

followed had later laws not placed the Commissariat in the governmental
sphere.

But that is not enough.

The Plan must be supported by the

representatives of all the principal views in the nation:
the very basis of democracy.

this is

The gradual withdrawal of Parliamentary

participation is now endangering the political control of the Plan.

On

the other hand, certain social groups are intensifying their intervention.
The loose system of parliamentary control began to take shape
during the period covered by the First Plan; control was indirectly

applied through the granting of funds required for implementing the Plan.
The problem of parliamentary approval was raised in connection with the

Second Plan.

By that time, it had been recognized that it was not an

ordinary legislative document.

short-only three articles —

The bill relating to it was extremely

and it conveyed the approval of the appended

document which set forth a list of targets, a statement of sums required
to reach these, and an outline of the legislation to be introduced.
Parliament was not asked to subscribe to the appended provisions which

together constituted the Plan and which would be the subject of the

decisions at a later stage, but to approve only a general line of action.
In the Third and Fourth Plans the form of the document remained

unchanged, but it was accompanied by program laws which extended its
range.

However, Parliament was taking less and less hand in the matter.
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Even the indirect control exercised through the annual vote of funds was

diminishing.

The sums earmarked for the program-laws can not be

rediscussed each year, and the time-limits imposed by the Constitution

of the Fifth Republic are too short to allow thorough scruting of the
purposes to which they are to be put.

Article Two of the bill approving

the Fourth Plan did introduce in important inovation.

Before issuing

its instructions for the Fourth Plan to the Commissariat, the Government
put before Parliament a bill approving a report on the major considerations

guiding the preparation of the Plan in view of the need to develop
the country: in particular economic expansion, the distribution of the
gross domestic product between investment and consumption, the desirable
pattern of final consumption and the directions to be followed by social

and regional policy respectively.

This innovation was retained during

the early stages of preparation of the Fifth Plan.

The fundamental requirements of planning seems to be incompatible
with a parliamentary system in which power is divided between an
elected legislative body and an executive which it controls.

The

flexibility of planning is hardly consistent with the rigidity of a

law.

Unforeseeable changes in the economic situtaion, political upheaval,

or new developments in international trade arrangements call for rapid

adjustments which can not be set forth in a legislative document.

Approval of a general line of policy, rather than of a detailed text, is
a solution which leaves the executive free to modify its aims.
Furthermore, planning is useful only insofar as it puts forward a

group of consistent decisions.

If any part of the Plan is changed, the

planned economic balance and; growth may be endangered.

Continunity is

another indispensiKLe condition for effectiveness which is ndt
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compatible with parliamentary control.

It is useless to draw up a four

year plan, if its targets are to be called in question whenever the

legislature chooses to discuss prices, subsidies and other economic
matters, as it is likely to do, especially during the budget debates.
The present solution to the problem of cohesion and continuity verses
political control is a compromise.

Parliament is able to approve the

general trend of the Plan, but most of the means of fulfillment lie
beyond its control, since they depend either upon the Executive or
the management of the firms.

This compromise is not entirely

satisfactory, for while it is inevitable that the Parliament must
give up some of its prerogatives out of necessity,

its control is

growing weaker and weaker.

The control which parliament exerts at the earliest stages of
preparation, when the main hypotheses upon which the Plan is based are

determined, relates to a limited number of basic options.

It is

impossible to pursue every aim simultaneously; therefore, choices must

be made.

But if the political authorities are to make a rational choice,

they must know to what it will lead; alternative models of development,
indicating aH of the possibilities in full detail, are difficult to
prepare and present in simple terras.

So far, preliminary forecasts

have only offered broad alternatives in matters of growth.

Once this

technical difficulty has been overcome, it irf^ still remain for the
bodies which are to use the decisions to show confidence in the prospects

described.

For they might challenge these prospects, and this would

drive the technical experts and the administrative agents to take upon

themselves the decisions that Parliament is unable to make, because they
tend to make unrealistic proposals.
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Therefore, the question remains as to which of the authoritative

bodies ought to choose between the alternatives, to fix the objectives,

before the Plan is put on paper.

Up to now, parliamentary democracy

has proved incapable of effective control or economic decision-making.

Could it be replaced by an economic democracy based upon group repre
sentation acting by direct participation, rather than solely upon the
electoral process and majority decisions?

Group representation has

played an important part at the level of the Modernization Commissions,

the Economic and Social Council, and the regionals committees.

There

is, however, a great temptation to push this development as far as
possible by authorizing these bodies to make the fundamental decisions.

Their familiarity with economic problems would surely prevent them
from making unrealistic proposals like Parliament.
However, there is a danger in relying upon organized groups.

National

and regional contacts between the various interests and the Administration

might lead to something resembling a corporate system, which may create
a kind of mutual agreement to the sole benefit of the leaders of the

different camps.

Organized interests would obtain privileges at the

expense of those who are not organized and sometimes against the
general interest.

If problems are settled without reference to Parlia

ment, they are removed from all political control.

In this situation the

Civil Servants and the economic leaders go unsupervised and exceed the
limits of their political responsibility,

Political control ought to

be left to Parliament, so that is has the last word in the general

direction of planning.

Not only is Parliament able to protect the non

organized groups, but the nation's political representatives are aware
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of its immediate general interest, for they are in closer touch with
the population and its needs.

In the final analysis, one must say that the French system does
serve as an example to the West, demonstrating that economic planning

can operate in a democratic society.

A really flexible and democratic

plan calls for unobtrusive, but well coordinated organization, a
rational and effective means of enforcement that will allow the working

of certain automatic factors, and genuine political supervision.

The

organization has won general agreement; its flexibility and the

participation of the various groups in the planning agencies have kept
official intervention from becoming too obtrusive.

Implementation

of the Plan is carried out indirectly through financial measures, rather
than by direct constraint.

Firms are offered incentives, but they

retain the right to select their methods of action.

However, the

political control of the Plan has not been well established.

Four

successive plans have been prepared with the principle of parliamentary

control being questioned, but in practice this control has been growing
weaker each year.
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